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Soon after independence in 1975, Mozambique was plunged 
into a protracted civil war  involving the ruling party Frelimo 
and the rebel movement Renamo. Renamo controlled several 
areas until when a ceasefire was reached in October 1992. 
After the restoration of peace in the country Renamo lost all 
subsequent multiparty elections held in the country since 
1994. Despite the initial assurance that peace had been 
established in the country, between 2012 and 2014 there was 
an unexpected upsurge of tension between these traditional 
rivals. This upsurge can be explored from several dimensions 
but the hallmark of this paper is that this tension may actually 
be explained within the framework of dynamics related to 
traditional authorities. Traditional authorities have played an 
influential role in Mozambique since the colonial period. 
Initially, traditional authorities formed the backbone of 
Renamo support but social-political dynamics forced them to 
change their affiliation to Frelimo. It is actually this shift of 
political affiliation from Renamo to Frelimo that arguably led 
to the said upsurge of political tension in Mozambique. 
 









The argument of this paper is constructed around the perceived relevance of 
traditional authorities in capturing the votes especially in rural areas. The 
underlying question is: Who has the legitimacy and authority to represent and 
speak for the populace? In the context of Africa, the debate is directly related 
to the question of the role of traditional authorities especially in rural areas. In 
this case it is depicted as a discreet struggle between the formal state and 
informal traditional authorities for control of the local populace. At the heart 
of this interrogation is the widely held perception that traditional leaders are 
politically influential at local level, hence the state aims at ‘capturing’ them so 
as to have a reliable and broader political platform at local level. In other 
words, whosoever is at the helm of state power must control traditional 
authorities to sustain political power.   
 
Mozambique is an excellent case study to examine this debate. For close to 
two decades it was involved in a protracted civil war that killed millions of its 
citizens and destroyed most of its infrastructure. The ruling Frelimo 
systematically undermined the traditional leadership structures that were 
officially abolished in the country. Frelimo’s rival, Renamo, welcomed 
traditional leaders and re-established their authorities in areas where they 
gained control. Traditional leaders formed the bulk of Renamo support 
throughout the civil war period. When the Renamo and Frelimo hostilities 
ceased in 1992, Frelimo went ahead to gain support of the traditional leaders. 
This constantly incensed Renamo and arguably led to the upsurge of tensions 
in the country which climaxed in 2014 when the Renamo leader threated to re-
ignite the civil war. 
 
The paper is based on newspaper articles published in Mozambique and a 
wider literature survey on the topic. The paper is structured as follows: after 
introduction, the first part of the paper builds a conceptual base followed by a 
discussion on the colonial history of the country. The next sections focus on 
formation of Frelimo and Renamo as well as the role of traditional leaders in 
post-colonial Mozambique. Afterwards, the paper examines Frelimo’s post-
civil war process of capturing traditional leadership’s loyalty and this 
examination is followed by a discussion on the final episode of the upsurge of 
tension. Before concluding, the paper highlights the ethnic factor in the 
Renamo-Frelimo conflict. 




2.0 Conceptual issues: Debate on the role of traditional authorities 
The debate on traditional authorities1 in Africa has mainly focused on whether 
they are compatible with democratic systems. In this case, according to Logan 
(2008: ii), the debate on the role of traditional authorities in Africa can 
roughly be categorised into two: the ‘traditionalists’ and the ‘modernists’. 
According to this categorisation, traditionalists “regard Africa’s traditional 
chiefs and elders as the true representatives of their people, accessible, 
respected, and legitimate, and therefore still essential to politics on the 
continent”. On the other hand, the modernists regard traditional authority as 
“chauvinistic, authoritarian and increasingly irrelevant form of rule that is 
antithetical to democracy”. A little bit different from Logan’s (2008) 
categorisation, Ntsebeza (2006) brings in the citizenship perspective and 
identifies three schools of thought that prescribe on the future of traditional 
authorities: 1) those who argue for a common citizenship perspective, 2) those 
who argue that it should mix or co-exist with the formal governance system, 
and 3) those who argue for integration of the traditional system and call for 
adoption of certain values and practices in the formal governance system. 
Those who argue for a common citizenship contend that existence of 
traditional authorities is another extension of the colonial tactic of divide and 
rule. Thus communities in the rural areas who are subjected to traditional 
authorities do not exercise their citizenship hence they are subjects whilst 
those in the urban enjoy citizenship rights. Their suggestion is complete 
dismantling of the traditional authority system because it is not compatible 
with contemporary democratic principles. In the mixed or co-existence model 
supporters argue that the traditional authorities do not normally compete with 
the state, and, therefore, their role should be advisory and ceremonial. In some 
cases their role is in maintenance of social order and community mobilisation. 
The conditions for fulfilment of this model are that the roles of politicians and 
traditional authorities should be clarified and also traditional authorities should 
accept that their role is subservient to political roles. Finally, the integration 
model builds on the mixed model but goes on to argue that the traditional 
system has certain elements which are compatible with the liberal democracy 
hence these elements need to be integrated. Thus “there is also a strong 
                                                            
1Unless otherwise stated, the paper interchangeably uses the concepts of traditional 






assumption in this model that the institution of traditional leadership can be 
transformed and democratised” (Ntsebeza, 2006:32). 
 
Logan (2008) identifies another growing school of thought which she labels 
the pragmatic-traditionalists. Some of the scholars in this school of thought 
are West and Kloeck-Jenson (1999), de Sousa Santos (2006), Lund (2006) and 
Eggen (2011). This school of thought takes a middle ground in the modernity- 
traditionalist debate. First of all, the view of this school of thought is to 
acknowledge that traditional authorities are not currently weakening hence the 
institution will still exist even if democracy gains strength. Secondly, the 
pragmatic-traditionalists also recognize the core weaknesses of the institution 
but argue that there are so many elements which can be strengthened for the 
benefit of communities. In this case the pragmatic-traditionalists focus on 
“ways in which the institutions of traditional authority can be effectively 
blended with the needs of the state and the principles of democracy” (Logan, 
2008:7).  
 
The core interest in the traditional leadership in Africa is not just how to 
incorporate traditional authorities in modern systems of governance but the 
dynamics of power relations at play initiated by their perceived influence. In 
this case, the paper further extends this state versus traditional authority debate 
by highlighting the power dynamics between Frelimo and Renamo in which 
the traditional authorities play a pivotal role. 
 
3.0 Mozambique’s colonial history and the role of traditional 
authorities 
It is the ‘Effective Occupation’ derived from the Berlin Conference of 1884/5 
that prompted the Portuguese to start extending their political and military 
control of Mozambique from coastal areas into the inland (Cumbe, 2010). 
Enlisting the support of some local ethnic groups, in the 1890s several wars 
(known as Pacification Campaigns) were fought against chiefs who refused to 
be under the Portuguese political control. For instance Ngungunyane, the 
Emperor of Gaza, was defeated and deported to Portugal.  In this case “both 
the Portuguese administrators and the régulos retained the ability to adjust 
traditions to answer different individual situations” (Cumbe, 2010:11). This 
campaign was undertaken between 1886 and 1912 and the end result was the 
creation of new territorial identities. Just like the system of indirect rule of the 




British, the Portuguese also attached themselves to traditional rulers who were 
known as régulos to reach out to the rural communities. According to Cumbe 
(2010), about 5% of the chiefs were former African colonial administrators 
who were appointed by the colonial authorities to the position of régulos as a 
reward for their loyalty.  
 
According to Cumbe (2010), the role of traditional authorities in Mozambique 
became clear and systematized through the Colonial Act which was published 
in 1930, Decree number 1857. This Decree became a law in 1933 and it led to 
the establishment of new social-political administrative policies and structures 
that guided the colonial masters during the colonial period. Through this law, 
Mozambique was demarcated into provinces which were headed by a 
Governor. The Governor reported to the Governor General who was under the 
Minister of Colonies. Below the Governor, other administrative offices were 
Provincial Governors and District Administrators. Reporting to the Colonial 
Administrator, the traditional authorities were mainly supposed to collect 
taxes, conduct annual population census, organize forced labour, and 
implementation of various colonial policies. During the armed struggle for 
independence (1962-1975), traditional authorities either supported Frelimo 
fighters or collaborated with the colonial masters. In the areas that Frelimo 
controlled, traditional authorities were recognized and given responsibilities of 
coordinating transportation of military equipment and collection of food for 
the fighters. As will be discussed later, this relationship was, however, 
terminated when Mozambique attained independence in 1975. 
 
4.0 Formation of Frelimo and Renamo 
The formation of Frente de Libertacao de Mozambique (Frelimo) was 
announced on 29 May 1962 in Accra, Ghana, and it was an amalgamation of 
two Mozambican exiled freedom movements: Uniao Democratica Nacional de 
Mozambique (Udenamo) and Mozambique African Union (MANU)__ a third 
organisation, Uniao Nacional Democratica de Mozambique  Independente 
(Unami) joined a month later in Dar es Salaam. Its first President was the 
western-educated academician Dr Eduardo Mondlane. He was later killed in a 
car bomb in Tanzania and he was succeeded by Samora Machel who led the 
organisation into independence. The party experienced numerous internal 
problems throughout its existence in diaspora which may also have 





amalgamation was mainly ‘forced’ by the newly independent African states, 
such as Tanzania and Ghana, who had their own conflicting interests which 
was later reflected in policy direction dilemmas. Secondly, the founding 
members held completely opposing views on how to run their organisation as 
well as the liberation philosophy. This difference in philosophy was mainly 
influenced by the cold war. Mondlane was mainly moderate and leaned more 
to the west whilst most of the rank and file were radical revolutionary groups 
with eastern oriented ideologies.  The third problem faced by Frelimo was in 
relation to the issue of ethnicity/tribalism. 
 
The ethnic problem that plagued Frelimo has a historical link; “Mozambicans 
from the central and northern regions of the country have a bias against those 
from the south” (Cabrita, 2000:21).  Those who are called southerners are 
found in the area south of Save River and are generally referred to as the 
Shangaan. This does not necessarily mean that the Shangaan are a 
homogenous ethnic group but the name refers to various ethnic groups which 
are followers of, or were influenced by, Soshangane, a traditional chief who 
settled in the area from Kwazulu-Natal in South Africa in the 17th Century. In 
this case, “the people living to the north of the Save River, the ‘southerners’ 
call them the Chigondo, the outsiders or the people from afar.”  The ethnic gap 
was reinforced by the Portuguese when they established schools in the South 
and incorporated most of the people from this area in their colonial 
administrative structure (Cabrita, 2000:23). Consequently, when Frelimo was 
established it was dogged by the same problems. Most of the highly educated 
members  of  the party were from the southern region, hence they ended up 
occupying the political leadership positions, while those from the north 
composed the rank and file of the military wing or ‘foot soldiers’. This 
scenario was constantly highlighted by those who defected from the 
organisation. Many years later, when Frelimo was fighting against Renamo 
which was led by a northerner, it was frequently said by some people that the 
war was between the north against the south. In an interview conducted by 
Cabrita (2000:208) with a former government soldier, he said that Samora 
Machel (a southerner) “regarded the Renamo issue merely as an ethnic dispute 
between Ndaus and Senas [northerners] on the one hand, and the Shangaan 
[southerners] on the other over which tribe ruled the country”. Many analysts, 
however, explain that the problem in Mozambique is not the ethnic issue but 
regional, which is reinforced by the socio-economic imbalance (Shenga 2008). 




This paper subscribes to this perspective as later discussed in subsequent 
sections. 
 
Renamo was formed in 1976 by the former Frelimo independent fighter Andre 
Mathadi, Matsangaice  Dyuwayo who had defected to Rhodesia after heeding 
to a call by the anti-Frelimo radio Voz da Africa Livre which was initially 
based in Rhodesia but later relocated to Pretoria in South Africa after 
Rhodesia’s independence2 (Cabrita 2000). The radio was supported by the 
white minority led government of Rhodesia. Through the publicity created by 
the Voz da Africa Livre radio, several groups of youth and former soldiers 
crossed the border to join it. Later the movement established its headquarters 
within Mozambique itself controlling several areas until when a cease fire was 
reached in October 1992. The rebel leader was killed in action in October 
1979 and his position was taken over by Afonso  Dhlakama who has remained 
its leader to this day. Initially, Renamo did not have a clear political agenda 
but simply claimed that it was not a political party and it stated that its main 
aim was  removing the Frelimo government and introducing democracy in the 
country. In this case it claimed that it only intended to replace the military 
machinery once in power. However, the movement later developed a more 
coherent policy agenda which included introduction of a capitalist biased form 
of development and restoration of traditional leadership in the rural areas. 
 
5.0 Post-colonial Mozambique and the role of traditional 
authorities (1975-1992) 
This section focuses on the 1975 to 1992 period in which Renamo and Frelimo 
were involved in the civil war. The discussion highlights the relationship of 






2Gumende (2010) takes the Frelimo account which states that Renamo was formed by 
a former Mozambican soldier Colonel Oscar Cardoso with assistance of the Rhodesian 
intelligence chief Ken Flowers and later in collaboration with the South African 
military. Cabrita’s (2000) account however seems more convincing that Flowers in his 





5.1 Frelimo and traditional authorities: An adversarial relationship 
During its campaign for independence, Frelimo garnered the support of rural 
traditional leaders, but once the colonialists were removed from power, 
Frelimo no longer considered its partnership with the traditional leaders. 
Taking a Marxist approach, Frelimo felt that to enhance rural productivity, 
there was a need for destroying the existing villages which had deep 
attachment to the traditional past and resettle its people in newly created 
communal villages. Officially, the government argued that it was difficult to 
implement development programmes in the scattered rural areas unless its 
people were re-located in different geographical areas of the country where 
they could easily be accessed. The main aim of the government was to 
completely change the rural people’s lifestyle so that they aligned themselves 
to the Frelimo Marxist principles. Some of the practices and lifestyles the 
government detested include “religious and spiritual ceremonies, adherence to 
cultural heritage, succession rights, ownership of land and livestock, and 
trading” (Cabrita, 2000:117). Specifically, these “were all viewed as 
incompatible with the tenets of a revolutionary society” (Cabrita, 2000:117). 
Ultimately, it was expected that the citizenry were going to renounce their 
ethnic identities and take on another identity that subscribed to the needs of 
the government. As former president of Mozambique, Samora Machel once 
said “for the nation to live, the tribe must die” (in Berman et al, 2004:8). 
Traditional leaders and their subjects who resisted this re-location were 
arrested and sent to the so-called re-education camps and, if they continued to 
resist, they were tortured or executed. Building around the concept of 
agriculture, these resettlement communities were envisaged to end tribalism 
through a common goal of agricultural development. As Samora Machel (in 
Alpers, 1974:49), explained some years before independence in 1971,  
 
If I am a Nyanja, and cultivate the land alongside a Ngoni, I sweat 
with him, wrest life from the soil with him ... With him I am 
destroying tribal efforts, and I feel united with him ... With him I 
am destroying tribal, religious and linguistic prejudices, all that is 
secondary and divides us. Unity grows with the growing plant, 
with the sweat and intelligence we both mingle with the soil.  
 
Despite a determined government effort, “resistance to the resettlement 
program is known to have taken place wherever it was introduced” (Cabrita 




2000:117). Clandestine efforts were employed by government to implement 
the programme, such as sending government forces disguised as armed bandits 
to threaten the people and government responding by sending the people to 
these newly created communities under the pretext of offering protection to 
them. In some cases, natural disasters such as floods and droughts were 
another excuse used to relocate the people to areas that the government 
identified. Each community was set up in a particular prearranged pattern. For 
instance, “Frelimo ruled that each communal village should have a party 
organ, an assembly composed of party-designated members, mass democratic 
organisations, and the standard security services” (Cabrita 2000:118). Each 
community had an ideological department that was responsible for 
disseminating party ideology through newspaper and radio. 
 
The government efforts were not achieved as “rural Mozambicans became 
even more entrenched in their traditions, and developed an even greater sense 
of hostility towards Frelimo” (Cabrita 2000:119). By taking party officials 
from southern Mozambique to central and northern parts of the country so as 
to take over the roles that were previously handled by traditional authorities, 
the gap between central government and grassroots people further widened 
and also threatened to enhance the northern-southern ethnic rivalry. 
 
5.2  Renamo and traditional authorities: An accommodating 
relationship 
The uniqueness of Renamo is that, unlike other southern African liberation 
and rebel movements, it permanently operated from within the country 
throughout its struggle. In this case, the movement heavily relied on the good 
will of the local communities for its survival. Consequently, in each and every 
area of its influence, it reinstated traditional chiefs who assisted in the local 
administration and providing food to the rebels. Why it was easy for Renamo 
to link with local people can also be understood when we take into 
consideration the fact that most of the Renamo leadership was of peasant 
origin. The link with traditional chiefs and local people can be explained as 
follows: 
 
Before Renamo established a base, permission was as a matter of 
course sought from the local medium. This was normally arranged 





influential in the Gorongosa area, blessed Andre Matsangaice 
himself. Traditional chiefs spoke at length about the customs and 
beliefs of their areas, which were supposed to be strictly adhered 
to by Renamo’s rank and file. John Kupenga, a Renamo guerrilla 
from Manica, stressed that failure to adhere to local traditions 
could upset the spirits who then punished the transgressors 
severely (Cabrita, 2000:159). 
 
The traditionalists welcomed Renamo and they were called mulunguisse or 
those who have come to “straighten things up” (Cabrita, 2000:196). Various 
scholars have examined the relationship of Renamo and rural traditional 
authorities. O’Laughlin (2000) and Geffray (1990 in Buur and Kyed, 2005) 
argue that Renamo managed to succeed during the civil war due to its ability 
to recognise and support the programme of reinstating chiefs. Furthermore, 
Abrahams and Nilsson (1995 in Buur and Kyed, 2005) arguably point out that 
it is actually the banning of chiefs in the rural areas that could be attributed to 
one of the causes of the civil war. Gumende (2010) does not attribute the 
internal weaknesses of Frelimo per se but external forces such as the 
Rhodesian government and later apartheid South Africa through their policy 
of dis-stabilisation of the region as the main contributing factor to the 
emergence of Renamo. Igreja (2008) cautions that there is a continuous bitter 
debate on what really caused the civil war, hence as scholars we should 
carefully analyse each narrative as these have been highly politicised in 
Mozambique. However, the most plausible explanation is provided by Vaux et 
al (2006:9) who argue that although the primary instigators of the civil war 
were from outside Mozambique (Rhodesia and South Africa in particular), this 
 
War was also driven by internal factors such as reaction against 
FRELIMO’s socialist policies, especially collectivisation, and the 
grievances of traditional rulers and religious groups who felt side-
lined by FRELIMO. There was an underlying confrontation 
between city-based modernity and deep-rooted tradition. 
 
6.0 Frelimo’s post-civil war process of capturing traditional 
leadership loyalty: The beginning of tension 
After the end of the civil war in 1992, Frelimo started implementing plans of 
winning support in the rural areas which were dominated by Renamo led by 




their traditional authorities. Frelimo used several means in order to win back 
this rural support: official recognition of traditional authorities, use of 
traditional leaders during campaigns, manipulating the process of selecting 
traditional leaders, and using traditional leaders as a vehicle to reach 
antagonistic rural areas. 
 
6.1 Frelimo’s formal recognition of traditional leadership 
Although it is assumed that the Frelimo government completely incapacitated 
the traditional systems of authority during the civil war, this is not really the 
case. According to the observation by Buur and Kyed (2005: 8) “institutions 
based on kinship and hereditary succession continued to exist, and many post-
colonial local state officials relied unofficially on day-to-day collaboration 
with chiefs often” (emphasis added). Donors who were keen to ensure that 
there was decentralised local governance in Mozambique in the post war 
period noted that viable civil society structures that could potentially represent 
the people at grassroots level were non-existent but kinship traditional systems 
were available and deemed to have the potential of playing the role of 
representation. Buur and Kyed (2005:10) aptly observe on how the state came 
to recognise chiefs: 
 
In rural Mozambique the war had created a situation of 
‘decentralisation by default’, where governance was in large part 
taken care of by non-state actors operating outside the sovereign 
power of the state. Significant among such non-state actors were 
chiefs and Renamo militias, forged in opposition to the Frelimo 
state. Against this background, state recognition of chiefs came to 
be seen as a solution to the problem of meagre state presence and 
contested legitimacy.  
 
Consequently, one of the challenges that the post war Mozambique faced was 
how to establish a viable decentralised system of governance in rural areas. 
Hence the debate on the role of traditional authorities in Mozambique came to 
the fore in the context of how to effectively implement decentralisation policy 
(Cau, 2004). In the urban and semi-urban areas, the Municipal Law 2/1997 led 
to the 1998 democratic elections in thirty-three municipalities which are also 
known as autarquias. However, the rural areas were not covered by this piece 





and sub-rural areas of Mozambique (the decree did not go through parliament, 
but it is a ministerial approved document). Consequently in 2002 the decree 
was implemented which witnessed the recognition of traditional leaders and 
secretaries of sub-urban quarters or villages who were called ‘community 
authorities’ (Buur and Kyed 2005:5). Another important piece of regulation is 
the 2003 Lei dos órgãoslocais do Estado (the LOLE-law) which regulates all 
state institutions below the district level. All these regulations highlight fact 
that recognised community leaders play the dual role of “community 
representatives” as well as “assistants of the state” and it is the latter role 
which seems to take prominence (Buur and Kyed, 2005:6). 
 
Official recognition of the identified traditional leaders was highly formalised 
through signing of the contract and acceptance of the national flag, uniform 
and state emblems by the traditional authorities to be displayed at their 
residence. The Frelimo led government constructed offices for the said 
traditional authorities and, in some cases, roads which reached to the house of 
the recognised traditional authority. 
 
6.2 Traditional leaders as Frelimo’s campaign tool 
The 1994 and 1999 general elections witnessed popular support of Renamo in 
rural areas of Mozambique3. Frelimo wanted to ensure that there should be 
reversal and so after the first general elections, for instance, the president and 
other leading Frelimo- leaders spent most of their time campaigning in rural 
areas where they proclaimed that they were in partnership with the aspirations 
of chiefs. However, within the party, the debate of modernists (anti-traditional 
leadership) and traditionalists (pro-traditional leadership) raged. As already 
mentioned above, lack of state presence at local level (as observed by donors 
as well) and contested legitimacy led to success of the traditionalist 
perspective. Some of the responsibilities of community authorities or 
                                                            
3In 1994, Renamo won 45% of the parliamentray seats while Frelimo won 55% 
(Lloyd 2011). In 1999 total tallied provincial votes showed that Renamo got 57% 
while Frelimo 43% but due to certain complexities of the electoral system in 
Mozambique, this huge increase in number of votes for Renamo did not imply larger 
number of seats in parliament (Lloyd 2011). In 2004, Renamo heavily reduced its 
number of parliamentary seats from 90 to 51 seats while FRELIMO increased its seats 
from 160 to 191 (Vaux et al 2006). 




traditional leaders are worth noting, and these, as stipulated in the Decree 
15/2000, are Nation building and Recognition of traditional authority and 
culture.  
 
In relation to nation building, the Decree states that “the recognised authorities 
should display the national flag daily at his/her homestead, use and display 
emblems of the republic and a uniform, and secure participation in national 
celebration days held by local administrative personnel”. Similarly, in relation 
to the recognition of traditional authority and culture, it “obligate[s] 
community authorities to uphold local customs, uses and cultural values…and 
to participate in investigating forms of local traditional culture such as dances, 
food, songs, music and ceremonies” (Buur and Kyed 2005:14). 
 
Taking advantage of this decree and its obligations, traditional authorities 
were obliged to be present when Frelimo politicians were out campaigning in 
the rural areas. The presence of traditional leaders legitimised  Frelimo during 
such critical periods. There is a case in point which was captured in the 
Mozambique News Agency which ably demonstrates this development: 
 
Guebuza's next stop was Caia, on the south bank of the Zambezi, 
where, for the first time in this campaign, a group of "regulos" 
(quasi-traditional chiefs) pledged support, and promised to do all 
in their power to secure victory for Frelimo. At rally after rally 
they can be seen, seated in the front row, wearing their military-
style caps, their brightly coloured sashes and their insignia. The 
regulos used to be regarded as natural allies of Renamo, but 
judging from the statement of the Caiaregulos that might be 
changing, and the government's strategy of holding out the hand 
of friendship to these chiefs may be paying political dividends 
(Mozambique News Agency, 12th November 2004). 
 
This shift of allegiance started to infuriate the Renamo party and contributed 
to the build-up of tension. 
 
6.3 Manipulation of the process to identify traditional leaders 
Prior to the implementation of the Decree, there was, among other things, a 





which existed during the pre-colonial period) and their sub-chiefs (chefe do 
grupo and chefe da povoação) by their communities. 
 
However, Buur and Kyed (2005) are quick to point out that the process of 
identifying the true traditional authorities was not as straightforward as it 
might be assumed and also created several potential future problems. In this 
case Buur and Kyed explain that due to many changes that have occurred in 
the Mozambican society from the colonial and civil war period, the 
identification was beset with numerous problems. The Decree did not specify 
how communities were to identify the traditional authorities by arguing that 
the customs of the said communities should dictate. Since communities are not 
homogeneous, community members who were more articulate and dominated 
the process ended up getting their way. In some cases, the colonial and post-
colonial state records were also used to verify these leaders (yet it was 
proclaimed that true traditional leaders have their lineage traced back to the 
pre-colonial period). Buur and Kyed further observe that owing to these 
irregularities, several conflicts emerged which have not completely abated. 
Cumbe (2010:17) mentions that “in some areas the process of recognition and 
legitimization of the community leaders is mostly influenced by the two main 
political parties that participated in the civil war (Frelimo and Renamo)”. As 
one member of Renamo complained in parliament: 
 
The debate on the Commission report was characterised by 
Renamo attacks on the government…thus Linette Olofsson 
[Renamo] complained that in Chimuara, elections had been held 
for ‘community leaders’. ‘Since when in African tradition have 
there been elections for chiefs to occupy their legitimate places?’, 
she said (Mozambique News Agency, 24th April 2002). 
 
According to the allegations of Renamo and other opposition groups, Frelimo 
used this opportunity of identification of traditional leaders to push for their 
candidates and where they could not, the incentives they provided to these 
leaders were also enough to buy their loyalty. For example, in parliamentary 
debate, the leader of Renamo said: 
 
Dhlakama accused the ruling Frelimo Party of "destroying 
Renamo's political base", referring to the "regulos", the 




supposedly traditional chiefs, who lost much of their power at the 
time of independence. He accused Frelimo of "threatening" 
regulos, and of "replacing the true traditional chiefs with its 
puppets, thus breaking with customary succession rights through 
the family lineage" (Mozambique News Agency, 13th November 
2001). 
 
Another problem is that this process of rigid formalisation has also taken away 
one of the major advantages of traditional systems, flexibility. Issues of 
succession are also not well clarified in the Decree which may lead to 
potential problems amongst the traditional royal families. Finally, Buur and 
Kyed also highlight the problem of the Decree’s failure (which is also true in 
all other nation-states) to recognise the difference between state territory and 
social space (administrative political boundary and traditional community 
boundary). The fusion of these boundaries may contribute to problems of 
proper exercise of traditional authority.  
 
Whatever the case, traditional leaders became an established element of 
Mozambican governance structure with Frelimo at the helm. According to 
OSISA (2009:152), the impact of traditional authorities has been in the 
following areas: (1) Land management and administration as well as other 
natural resources; (2) Local citizen mobilization in national campaigns; (3) 
Facilitation of  local citizen participation in national and local development 
programmes; (4) Encouragement of local citizens to participate in elections; 
and (5) Provision of traditional justice administration (or  non-formal justice). 
 
6.4 Traditional leaders as a vehicle to reach antagonistic rural areas 
Buur and Kyed (2005) observe that in this case areas which had previously 
been war torn and had no visible presence of state institutions now ‘felt’ the 
state through the newly installed traditional authorities. Obarrio (2010:268) 
talks about the “invisible state” existing in the rural northern part of 
Mozambique “in a region where imaginaries of the state are weak and its 
legitimacy is feeble, in a province with a deep history of rebelliousness and 
hostility toward authority”. In these areas, Frelimo through the state 
machinery was able to have its presence felt and recognised through the 






On the day when the Administrator was going to make actual 
contact with this “invisible” entity and visit its territory, he invited 
me to be part of his delegation, composed of several of his aides 
in the local government, some administrators or smaller rural 
subdistricts, and the regulo (chief) Sukuta. Sukuta, the main 
“customary” authority situated above eight lesser chiefs scattered 
throughout the area, had recently attained official recognition 
from the state (Obarrio 2010:269). 
 
7.0 Final episode of the upsurge of tension: Threats of war 
Taking into consideration that Renamo is now weak and Frelimo has 
consolidated its power – to the extent that Mozambique is almost a one party 
state (Lloyd 2011; Sumich 2010; Vaux et al 2006) – it is unlikely that some of 
its current policies, such as those on traditional authorities, will be reversed 
soon. Specifically, it might even be argued inter alia that the increased support 
enjoyed in the previous elections could be the result of Frelimo’s campaigns 
of reaching out to the rural communities through its positive policies towards 
traditional authorities. The current picture emerging is that the re-introduction 
of traditional authorities in the rural areas has arguably usurped some of 
Renamo’s power, hence the party’s recent frustrations with the ruling party. 
For instance, by 2012 Renamo had started threatening war as captured in the 
following newspaper excerpt: 
 
Mozambique’s main opposition party, Renamo, has refused to 
meet with a commission set up by the ruling Frelimo Party to 
discuss issues which supposedly justify the recent threats to return 
to war made by Renamo leader Afonso Dhlakama…Since his 
sudden move from his house in the northern city of Nampula to a 
bush camp in the central district of Gorongosa, neither Dhlakama, 
nor any other Renamo leader, has issued a coherent list of 
demands or grievances…Dhlakama has warned that “I am 
training my men up and, if we need to, we will leave here and 
destroy Mozambique” (Mozambique News Agency, 20th 
November 2012). 
 
After another loss to Frelimo in the 2014 general elections, the leader of 
Renamo, Afonso Dhlakama, claimed the results of the election were faked by 




Frelimo and he even went further and threatened to set up a parallel 
government.  
 
8.0 Discounting the role of ethnicity 
 
According to Vaux et al. (2006), despite the fact that Mozambique has 16 
major ethnic groups this has never led to tensions in the country. Specifically, 
they observe that: 
 
Ethnicity has had remarkably little influence on the conduct of 
previous wars. Under colonial rule, the Portuguese manipulated 
the multiple ethnic groups, and inter-group conflict, by 
implementing a conscious policy of ‘divide and rule’ but never 
created the kinds of division that were the colonial legacy 
elsewhere in Africa... The reasons for this phenomenon are 
complex…In relation to most other African countries, ethnicity in 
Mozambique plays a minor role in politics (Vaux et al, 2006:10).  
 
In contemporary “Mozambican academic discourse, ethnic identity is closely 
linked to language” (Virtanen, 2005:227). According to Alpers (1974), the 
Portuguese propaganda during the fight for independence tended to align 
themselves with the Makua-Lomwe in order to discredit Frelimo which was 
mainly dominated by Makonde and southern ethnic groups. This, however, 
was not successful at that time. Vaux et al (2006) acknowledge the current 
perception widely held in the country that Southern ethnic groups have better 
opportunities as compared to the central and northern ethnic groups. Even in 
relation to political parties, Frelimo mainly draws support from the Shangana-
Ronga and Makonde ethnic groups, while opposition parties draw support 
from the Ndau, Sena and Makua ethnic groups. However, these differences 
according to Vaux et al. (2006:10), “revolve around regional differences and 
relate to economic factors rather than around the social issue of ethnicity but 
there remains a possibility that ethnicity could be mobilised during a desperate 
political struggle”. This observation is also supported by Lloyd (2011:7) who 
states that as compared to other African countries, ethnicity is very low but the 
north/central and southern region divide is prevalent. According to Lloyd, the 
tension is mainly between Frelimo and Renamo as political parties but not 







The debate on the role of traditional authorities in Africa can roughly be 
categorised into two: the ‘traditionalists’ and ‘modernists’. In the case of 
Mozambique, the ruling party, Frelimo, initially had a strong modernist 
approach hence abolished the traditional authorities. Renamo had a 
traditionalist approach, and, therefore, used their link to traditional 
leaders to reach out to the rural areas of the country. The new 
dispensation in the country after the end of civil war called for a new 
approach to politics in the Frelimo camp. They embraced the 
traditionalist approach so as to enable them to reach into the rural areas. 
It is this usurping of power from Renamo, symbolised by the shift in 
allegiance of traditional leaders, that arguably led to the upsurge of 
conflict that reached its climax in 2014 when the leader of Renamo 
threatened to re-ignite the civil war in the country. In other words, the 
adoption of the traditionalist approach by Frelimo has played a decisive 
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